

MINUTEMAN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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INFO

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TO - AID/W

PERIODIC 29/ (1)

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USCINCSO ATTN POLAD

USAID A 7

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Arnold H. Dadian
AID/OPA 10/2/80

DATE SENT

4 October 1966

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ACTION

INFO

FROM - **BOGOTA**

SUBJECT - Monthly Report - Public Safety Division
August 1966

REFERENCE -

I. SITUATION

1. The August 7 inauguration of President Carlos Lleras Restrepo proceeded with hardly a ripple insofar as breaches of the peace were concerned. However, the same may not be said for the countrywide law and order situation which took a turn for the worse during the month. Citizen deaths in rural violence were up sharply as was the number and seriousness of incidents of rural violence, especially in the southern part of the country. A new surge of bombings was directed at sabotage as well as terror effect, and one citizen, the first in the history of Colombia, lost his life along with 4 others in the August 4 bombing at the Colombiano-Americano (Bi-National) Center in Bogotá. The civil turbulence scene was dominated by a strike with a strong seasoning of violence, apparently exploited by extremists, by the students at the University of Antioquia at Medellin, with accompanying sympathy strikes at various educational institutions throughout the country. Traditional crime in urban centers was the only area where an appreciable pick-up in activity was not registered.

2. Daily Intelligence Bulletins from the National Police reflected the following figures and incidents worthy of note:

Rural Violence

Citizens murdered by bandits ----- 39
Citizens wounded by bandits -----
National Police murdered by bandits -----
National Police wounded by bandits -----

JRS-12
WC
LA
AMP
RD
APPC
TD
NGR
AIDSA

116-W

OTHER AGENCY
State
DOD
CIA
NSC

att OPS 10/8/66

OPS/LA FILE MATERIAL
Please return to Room 2642 or phone 7577

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

DRAFTED BY: H. Hardin:kwm
OFFICE: Public Safety
PHONE NO.:
DATE: 9/20/66
APPROVED BY: Herbert O. Hardin, Chief, PSD

AID AND OTHER CLEARANCES: FDFisher/DDIR, SComisic/EMB/POL, RMarsh/PO
GP-3 Downgraded at 3-year intervals.
cc: The Ambassador Char'lins/ODF, Chief, USMILGRP Col. Stanci/MA, RSampson/EMB/POL, FBllicia/LA, Col. Anderson

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Bandits captured by National Police -----	29
Bandits killed by National Police -----	8
Bandits wounded by National Police -----	3
Bandits killed by citizens -----	3
National Police patrols attacked -----	6
National Police posts attacked -----	1
Fincas attacked -----	11
Hi-jacks (Robberies of busses, autos, etc.) -----	13

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Stamp: ...
Stamp: ...

3. A step-up in the pressure by the army against the gangs of "Tiro Fijo" and Ciro Castaña Trujillo, communist oriented bandits in the Southern Tolima-Northeastern Huila areas, resulted in ambushes of army patrols, one on 19 July in the municipality of Neiva, Department of Huila where 15 army personnel were killed and another 15 wounded; and one on August 30 in the Municipality of Chaparral, Department of Tolima, in which 2 army personnel were killed and others wounded. The army pressure also appears to be "flushing" bandits into the peripheral areas into the hands of the National Police.

4. Another instance of a foreigner being killed in rural violence was the murder of a finca owner of European nationality when his finca was attacked in the Municipality of Codazzi, Department of Magdalena on August 4. The marauders, numbering about 50, were dressed in military uniforms and were carrying shoulder weapons.

5. In the Municipality of Valledupar, Department of Magdalena, on August 7, a gang of alleged smugglers attacked a patrol of National Police who were inspecting a bar, seriously wounding one sergeant. In beating off the attack, National Police killed four of the gang.

6. On August 9, in the Municipality of Santa Fe de Antioquia, Department of Antioquia, National Police captured an entire gang of 7 bandits who had been operating in that region.

7. On August 23, on the Ecuadorian Border, Department of Nariffo, a mixed patrol of National Police and soldiers made contact with a gang suspected of robbing a bank in Tumaco, the principal pacific port for that region. In the ensuing fight, two bandits were killed while a third was wounded.

8. The rising price of copper on the world market has apparently influenced an increasing number of communication and power land-line thefts in the rural areas of Colombia, where thieves have been stripping thousands of meters of copper wire from poles during the past few months, apparently to sell as scrap.

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Urban Crime

Citizens murdered by gangsters -----	2
Citizens wounded by gangsters -----	1
National Police wounded by gangsters -----	2
Gangsters captured by National Police -----	7
Gangsters killed by National Police -----	2
Gangsters wounded by National Police -----	1
Hi-jacks -----	5
Jail breaks -----	2

9. A bit of spark was added to the visit of the internal security evaluation team headed by Ambassador Timberlake when a gunfight took place on the outskirts of Bogotá a short distance from where the group was visiting the General Santander School for National Police Officers and Cadets. One of the Public Safety Advisors escorting the group hurried to the scene and took photographs (attached) during the culmination of the episode. The National Police and DAS had surrounded a house occupied by seven hoodlums wanted for the murder of a DAS agent the previous day, and several stick-ups. The demand to surrender was answered with gunfire which the police returned, and when authorities rushed the house, six of the hoodlums surrendered, one of them wounded, while a seventh, holed up in a kitchen coal bin with the wounded one, chose to resist and was canceled out by the police.

Civil Turbulence

Demonstrations and Manifestations -----	3
Riots -----	11
Civic Stoppages -----	2
Strikes -----	27
National Police injured in riots -----	7
Persons injured in riots -----	4
Persons arrested in riots -----	68

10. Most of the riots were attributable to the student strike in Medellin which began on August 1 and was still on at the end of the month. The university students went on several rampages, ranging through the streets of the business district, stoning public buildings and passing vehicles. High school students, joining on a pretext of sympathy, damaged traffic lights, signs, and public buildings. In Barranquilla, National Police found outsider representatives of the leftist-oriented Federation of National Universities (FUN) working among the ^{students} there. However, the students appeared to be ignoring the "orders" of the outsiders. The students at the Free University and some elements of the National University in Bogotá joined in sympathy for a brief period during which time they created minor disturbances

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and damage. On 19 August, the university students in Medellin paraded through the streets and congregated for a manifestation in Plaza San Ignacio and around the Hall of General Studies where they threw a large number of Molotov bombs at the National Police, injuring eight. The army was called in to back up the police before the riot was quelled. Twenty students were arrested in this fracas. Two hundred students barricaded themselves in the above-mentioned hall. The following day, the striking students took over other parts of the campus and the non-strikers established their classes off the campus. In the evening, a group of younger persons, apparently looking for excitement, joined the strikers and threw rocks at autos and houses around the university. The strikers stopped vehicles and extorted relatively large sums of money from the drivers to allow them to continue without damage to their vehicles. On the afternoon of August 28, a group of non-striking students entered the campus and dislodged the strikers from the buildings, turning four leaders over to the police, along with supplies of acids, combustibles, and fuses which had evidently been intended for use against authorities. The following day, the strikers, in reprisal for having been dislodged from the campus, took over a private school on high ground. That evening, they moved against the campus in an effort to recapture it. After a two hour struggle during which 2 police were injured and 27 students were arrested, the attack was broken up. On 30 August, the striking students gathered in Plaza San Ignacio from where they tried to launch street parades, but were prevented from doing so by the National Police. One agent was injured. The students then went on a rampage, stoning private homes in the area for five hours until the owners began firing in the air.


Terrorism & Sabotage

Bombs placed and/or exploded:

Terrorism -----	8
Sabotage -----	6
Persons killed by bombs -----	5
Persons injured by bombs -----	11
Arson -----	4
Persons killed in arson -----	5
Terrorists captured -----	3

11. Shortly before five p.m. on August 4, a woman employee at the Colombo-American Center, a USIS supported project, entered the ladies' restroom there and observed smoke coming from a paper bag in one corner of the room. She ran out and informed Mr. Fernando Saenz, Assistant Director of Cultural Affairs, who was the first employee she met. Saenz entered the restroom and the bomb apparently went off while he was leaning over to inspect it, literally blowing the man apart. The concussion ripped out several walls, killed three other persons instantly, and injured 12, one of whom died the following day. Among the dead was one Robert Smether, a local resident U.S.

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citizen and manager of the cafeteria at the center. Two other Colombian employees other than Saenz were killed, as well as another unidentified woman who was apparently in one of the booths of the restroom at the time of the blast. (See attached pictures and report) Damage done by the blast was estimated at 500,000 pesos.

12. In the town of La Dorada, Department of Caldas, August 8, a National Police agent on patrol found a high powered bomb in front of the DAS office in that town. The bomb was promptly disarmed.

13. In the City of Cúcuta, Department of Northern Santander, August 10, a homemade nuisance type bomb was exploded against the National Police Headquarters doing small damage.

14. In the Municipality of Icononzo, Department of Tolima, three bombs were exploded on a hacienda and poison was scattered in a pasture, poisoning livestock there.

15. In the city of Cartago, Department of Valle, August 8, National Police found a bomb containing 16 sticks of dynamite at a power generating station. Shortly after, another bomb was found fastened to one of the towers which support high tension lines there. Both bombs were successfully disarmed.

16. On August 14, near the highway north of Medellin, Department of Antioquia, a bomb was exploded against an oil pipeline, doing some damage.

17. On August 11, near the city of Manizales, Department of Caldas, National Police found two bombs near a high tension line tower, one of 16 and the other of 18 sticks of dynamite. Both bombs were disarmed.

18. On August 15, Municipality of Plato, a bomb was exploded against a natural gas line. Only small damage was done. ELN literature was left near the scene.

19. On August 29, Municipality of Molagavita, Department of Santander, terrorists put fire to a house. Five members of the family were burned to death.

20. Rumors of changes by the new administration in top leadership in DAS persisted through the month. Probably for this reason there appeared to be a certain hesitational behavior on the part of the high echelon, and a non-committal attitude.

21. There were vague rumors that Brig. General Bernardo Camacho Leyva, Director General of National Police would be replaced by a civilian director.

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This would be viewed as undesirable from a U. S. standpoint because of the probable political influence which the National Police would come under, because General Camacho is currently one of the most able and qualified Directors available (he is the first professionally trained Director General, having graduated from the first class at the Santander School for National Police officers and Cadets in 1940), he has been able to bring about a greatly improved working relationship between the National Police and the Army in the past year, and his cooperation with the USAID Public Safety Program has left little to be desired during the past nine months.

22. Eight majors were retired from the National Police on August 31, some by their own request and others for various reasons.

II. OPERATIONS

1. On 29 August, 70 non-commissioned officers of the National Police began a 56 hour course of "Supervision and Leadership". This training will be provided by the Superior of Public Administration with technical and funding support from USAID. The students are currently attending promotional courses at the National Police School for Non-Commissioned Officers and this training was integrated into the six-month course. By December, 1966, it is planned that 400 non-commissioned officers will have received the supervision and leadership course. The non-commissioned officers, numbering 3000, are considered a most important element of the National Police because they have risen to their present ranks from that of police agent, and therefore have had a broad and penetrating exposure to police operations; and they most commonly perform the actual function of supervision in the field.

2. Twenty-five majors of the National Police in a 10 month promotional course at the National Police School for Officers and Cadets General Santander to prepare them for the rank of lieutenant colonel, are taking the above mentioned course adjusted to their level of responsibilities. These officers represent the best in their category and include Major Mario Castillo Ruiz who is a graduate of the National Police Academy (F.B.I.) in Washington and has received other training in the U.S. which has enabled him to make substantial contributions to upgrading the training and operations of the National Police. The Supervision and Leadership course was integrated into their promotional course at recommendation of USAID because the majority of these officers will assume departmental commands and other important key positions after their promotion.

3. The second course of "Human Communications" training for National Police Instructors was started on August 23, 1966, for 17 National Police Officer Instructors from the School for Carabineros at Suba and the School for Non-Commissioned Officers. The officers receiving this instruction were selected on the basis of their potential for improving their proficiency as instructors,

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and in order that they can diffuse their learning to other instructors. The training is being given by the Colombian Civic Organization for Literisation, a non-profit organization, with technical and financial support from USAID.

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4. In accordance with a USAID-National Police plan to place greater emphasis on preparing the National Police to assume the criminal investigative role, General Gamacho sent a circular to all commands requesting them to send one of their best qualified officers of the rank of captain or major to attend the class in criminal investigation scheduled to begin in Bogotá on September 5. Major Enrique Valderama Vega, a U.S. trainee, was named to assume charge of organizing the class course and implementing it, coordinating with USAID Advisors. As a result, numerous conferences were held between USAID Public Safety Advisors, Major Valderama, Major Victor Alberto Delgado Mallarino, and Major Manuel Gonzales Duarte, National Police Coordinator to USAID Public Safety Division. The three aforementioned were receptive to suggestions made by Public Safety Advisors. Prospects for success of the course are considered good. It is anticipated that the number of officers attending the course will be 31.

5. On August 1, the Public Safety Municipal and Rural Advisors held a meeting with the F-4 (Administrative Officer) of the National Police to determine the disposition of outdated and inappropriate gasses, and to decide how to use the small quantity of CS gas on hand. It was decided to either destroy or turn over to the Army all outdated CS and DM gas. All outdated CN gas was to be employed in training of National Police personnel. CS grenades are to be held at the central armory for use in special cases when authorized by the Director General.

6. The Municipal Public Safety Advisor presented a plan to the F-2 in the Bogotá command of the National Police for utilization of three rooms which were secured on the second floor of the Bogotá headquarters, and AID-provided investigative equipment at the National Police warehouse has been earmarked for use. Approval of the Bogotá commander is pending. The Bogotá F-2 unit is presently staffed with eighty-two men. Of this number only four have been trained by USAID supported courses. Upon recommendation of the USAID Municipal Advisor, all personnel will be exposed to a 3 hour-per-day in-service course in criminal investigation beginning October 1. The USAID Public Safety Division will support the course with training equipment, technical material, and advise.

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7. The Municipal Public Safety Advisor visited Medellin August 29, 30, 31, and spent considerable time with the F-2 there. The number of personnel has been increased from 28 to 50 men. The Advisor recommended that another/be added, bringing the total to 80. During the visit, the Municipal Advisor observed rioting by students for two successive nights during which ninety

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National Police personnel armed only with the AID provided shields, tear gas, and wooden batons were directly committed against 450 to 500 students over whom they were able to establish complete control with only one policeman and a few students being slightly injured during those two nights.

5 8. In Bogotá the emergency FM radio net was installed and in operation in August. Fixed stations were installed at Station 100 (Bogotá Headquarters) dispatch center, F-2 headquarters, and the School for Carabineros where the Mobile Squadron is located. Another fixed station will be installed at Station 4 where the Bogotá task force is located. This will allow instantaneous communication between these points. Nineteen 1-watt FM hand portable units were also turned over to the Bogotá unit for tactical use.

5 9. Tactical radio equipment and a USAID-National Police installation team were sent the Department of La Guajira for the purpose of establishing tactical radio nets there. This is based on an agreement between the National Police and USAID to readjust priorities according to emerging need.

5 10. Public Safety Communications Advisors traveled to Neiva, Department of Huila to demonstrate the tactical radio equipment planned for installation in the Department. All officers in that command witnessed the demonstration.

5 11. One fixed station and five 40-watt mobile units were installed for DAS in Bogotá for use by their special surveillance unit.

12. The Public Safety Communications staff began an inventory of radio equipment, parts, accessories and associated equipment at the new National Police Transmissions Warehouse where the USAID communications shop was moved.

6 13. During the month, the Rural Police advisor conferred with the Personnel Office in the National Police in an effort to have officer graduates of the rural police training course at Espinal placed in assignments which will enable them to use their training to maximum effectiveness. This was based on complaints from numerous officers who had finished the course that they had been given assignment unrelated to the training.

14. Ambassador Timberlake and his Internal Security Evaluation Team arrived Bogotá late on August 13. They spent the following week receiving briefings and making on-the-spot inspections of USAID Public Safety and MAP projects as well as USAID-MAP Civic Action activities. On August 16, the group was accompanied by USAID Public Safety Advisors and MAP personnel to Bucaramanga, capital of Santander, where they were briefed by the commander of the Eighth Army Brigade and after lunch briefed by the Departmental Commander of the National Police and given a demonstration of the communications system of the Department and the city. On August 18, the group was given a briefing and

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answers to their questions by members of the USAID Public Safety Division before being taken to DAS where they received a briefing on DAS from officials there and were taken on a tour of the headquarters and operating units. A subsequent visit was made to the General Santander School for National Police Officers and Cadets where a tour was made of AID supported facilities, including the new AID equipped police laboratory building. Groups were brought in from other Bogotá police installations to provide demonstrations in riot control and other AID supported projects. The Chief Public Safety Advisor, who had been in AID/W engaged in consultation and training, returned to Bogotá on 13 August to be with the group, and departed for AID/W 19 August at the conclusion of their visit to complete his consultation.

III. EVALUATION

1. It appears that the new wave of rural violence, guerrilla activity, terrorism and civil turbulence may have one or a combination of several purposes: A gesture of defiance to the new administration; a probing of the attitude and reaction of the new administration; a demonstration to the external elements (block) that in-country subversive forces have some capability, and therefore merit support from without.
2. If new appointments and other changes are in store for DAS, it is probable that they will come during the month of September. With such turnover, a certain amount of new impetus and enthusiasm may be expected during the initial tenure which can serve to put DAS closer to the attainment of its broad objectives within the next two years.
3. It is believed that uninterrupted progress by the National Police and new developments in the AID Public Safety Program with respect to that organization indicate no planned change in top leadership in that organization.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

None at this time.

DEARBORN

Attachments

1. Photos of gunfight in Bogotá
2. Report and Photos of bombing at Central Colombo-Americano
3. Photos of student strike in Medellin

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ANNEX II (A)
NATIONAL POLICE

PIO/C	Item Numbers Received	Value	Condition	Disposition	Organization
0-60073	36-37-38 13-17-18-21 23-24-25-26 28-29-30-31 39-40-41-42-43-44 45-46 7-8-9-22-32-33	29,700.00	Good	B.D.	National Police
		12,691.30	Good	B.D.	National Police
		Unknown	Good	B.D.	National Police
0-60075	1 to 27	1,166.19	Good	B.D.	National Police
60039/60089	1	580.00	Good	B.D.	National Police
" "	1	7.00	Good	B.D.	National Police
5-60080	1-2-3-4-5-6-7	5,268.64	Good	B.D.	National Police
5-60073	35	Unknown	Good	B.D.	National Police
0-50075/98	1	135.00	Good	B.D.	National Police
5-60078	6-9	1,161.00	Good	B.D.	National Police
0-60073	3-6A-6A-2	75,396.95	Good	B.D.	National Police
0-60070	Laboratory Equipment		Good	B.D.	National Police
5-60051	Carbines		Good	B.D.	National Police

ANNEX II (A)
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS)

0-50105	1	800.00	Good	B.D.	DAS
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ANNEX II (B)
DELINQUENT PIO/C'S NATIONAL POLICE

0-50091	Items 3,56,14				
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ANNEX II (B)
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS)

5-50101	Automobiles - 10 Jeeps enroute				
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ANNEX II (C)
PIO/C'S ISSUED THIS MONTH - NATIONAL POLICE

NONE

ANNEX II (C)
PIO/C'S ISSUED THIS MONTH - DAS

NONE

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MONTHLY TRAINING REPORT
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS)
ANNEX I (B) AUGUST 1966

Place, Type of Training, Duration	Entered Tng. This Month	Total in Training	Returned This Month	This Year to Date	Cum. Total to Date
U.S. TRAINING					
IPA, 12 WEEKS SENIOR COURSE					1
IPA/WASHINGTON					120
16 WKS GENERAL COURSE	9	9	3	3	
U.S. POST OFFICE (X) GRAPHOLOGY, 6 MONTHS					1
TELETYPE MAINTENANCE, 5 WKS CHICAGO					1
INTERNAL SECURITY SUPERVISORY					1
WASHINGTON - 10 WKS					41
IAPA/PANAMA - 12 WKS GENERAL COURSE					7
IAPA/PANAMA - 1 WK BOMB DISPOSAL COURSE					30
IAPA/PANAMA - 5 WKS INTERNAL SECURITY COURSE					
LOCAL TRAINING					
20 HR. REVOLVER TNG					311
FBI-PPC COURSE (SENA, SSB RADIO COURSE, 6 MO, MEDELLIN & BOG)	3	3			6
RURAL SECURITY					93
SCHOOL, AGUA AZUL					24
INTERNAL SECURITY COURSE BOGOTA					
DAS ACADEMY, SUBA					
NEW AGENTS - 6 MOS	35	122			315
IN-SERVICE - 3 MOS					
TECHNICAL CRIMINOLOGY 4 MONTHS					182
CONFERENCES IN FIELD OFFICE BY IAPA GRADUATES					630

(X) U.S. Post Office Inspectors Course 4 MONTHS

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MONTHLY TRAINING REPORT
NATIONAL POLICE
ANNEX I (A) AUGUST 1966

Place, Type of Training, Duration	Entered This Month	Tng. Total in Training	Returned This Month	This Year to Date	Cum. Total to Date
<u>U.S. TRAINING</u>					
IPA/WASHINGTON 16 WKS GENERAL COURSE	4	4		16	68
IAPA/PANAMA 12 WKS GENERAL COURSE					2
IAPA/PANAMA 1 WK BOMB DISPOSAL COURSE					2
<u>THIRD COUNTRY</u>					
CRIMINALISTICS TRAINING CARACAS					1
<u>LOCAL TRAINING</u>					
USE OF THE BATON					18,000
1 HR CRIMINAL INVEST.					335
PATROL METHODS 1 WK					4,404
DRIVER TRAINING 2 WKS					450
REVOLVER REFRESHER TNG 2 HRS					4,470
FBI-PPC REVOLVER TNG 20 HRS					213
AUDIO-VISUAL 2 WKS					24
COUNTER-BANDIT TNG 12 WKS	18	18		18	174
PUBLIC RELATIONS TNG 2 WKS					21
COUNTER-BANDIT TNG 3 WKS					450
COMMUNICATIONS TECH. 9 MO.		12		12	20
COMMUNICATIONS RADIO OPERATOR 3 MONTHS					42
PUBLIC RELATIONS ENGLISH SPEAKING 3 MONTHS		49	49		37
CRIMINAL INVEST. 3 WKS					50
INSTRUCTOR TNG 3 HRS					13
RIOT CONTROL TNG. 1 MO.				2,849	2,849
POLICE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 220 HRS				25	25
FIREARMS TNG FOR INSTRUCTORS 16 HRS	70		70	289	289
HUMAN COMMUNICATIONS FUNDAMENTALS OF POLICE ADMINISTRATION 72 HRS	17	17		16	16
LEADERSHIP & SUPERVISION 56 HRS	70	70		25	25

ABOVE TRAINING IS IN ADDITION TO TRAINING CONDUCTED BY NINE SCHOOLS IN NINE POLICE COMMANDS IN THE COUNTRY AND THE OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL "GENERAL BARTANDER"

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TO: Mr. Raburn L. Howland, Acting General Services Officer USIS

FROM: Mr. Paul C. Hoeffey, Public Safety Advisor

SUB: Explosion at Colombo Americano
Bogotá August 4, 1966

Explosion

The explosion which occurred is properly categorized as a Blast or Concussion type. No pieces of metal were found at the scene to show the bomb to be of a fragmental nature. Therefore it can be assumed that the explosive material was not placed in a wood or metal container.

Bomb

The bomb was a simple or straight bomb consisting of dynamite with a fairly strong percentage of nitroglycerin. It was high explosive in character and due to the resulting blast effect and visible damage to the surrounding walls, floors, ceilings and fixtures, it was probably composed of 4-5 average (6" in length, 1" in diameter) sticks of dynamite tied or taped together and detonated by a non-electric blasting cap with a time fuse initiation.

Brown manila paper particles with a wax or paraffin coating were found at the site of the explosion and seem to confirm the presence of dynamite. No clock mechanism or battery fragments were found to show the bomb to be of mechanical time nature.

Location

In agreement with existing damage, flash burn scars and direction of explosion, the bomb (in the opinion of this Advisor) had to have been placed in the northeast corner of the women's rest room.

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