

AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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TO - AID/W TOAID A- 939 X
USCINCSO ATTN POLAD USAID A- 21 X

OPS/LA
DATE REC'D.

DATE SENT
March 18, 1966

DECLASSIFIED

Arnold H. Dadian *W.A.M.*
AID/OPA 10/3/80

BOGOTA

FROM .
SUBJECT . Monthly Report -- Public Safety Division
February 1966

REFERENCE .

I. SITUATION

The internal security problem in Colombia took on a distinct form in February with increasing EIW activity and a simultaneous overall reduction in the number of citizen deaths resulting from rural violence. Camilo Torres, alias "Helio" (Helium), defrocked-priest-turned-guerrilla leader was killed by the army almost six weeks after he had announced his union with the EIW. National Police casualties in the rural areas were light, but so were police successes against bandits except one notable incident in Tolima. Political assassinations continued; the number of fincas attacked was double the previous month, while rural hi-jackings were down. There were no kidnappings reported. National Police casualties were heavier in urban areas, as were casualties suffered by hoodlums, although the overall urban crime picture appeared relatively unchanged. The number of demonstrations and riots increased, mostly as a result of Torres' death; however, they were greater in number than seriousness. Strikes continued at about the same level. The political campaigning continued in the country with hecklers continuing their efforts to disrupt meetings. Terrorism was manifested mostly in the form of arson, with no bombings and no casualties reported.

National Police Intelligence Reports reflected the following figures and incidents of note:

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS

OPS/LA FILE MATERIAL
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PAGE 1 OF 11 PAGES

DRAFTED BY <i>Howardin/JDoney:jal</i>	OFFICE Public Safety	PHONE NO.	DATE 3/14/66	APPROVED BY: <i>Herbert O. Hardin, Chief, PS</i>
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AID AND OTHER CLEARANCES

DD/FFisher
ECR/POI/SComiskey
AG/CH...

cc: The Ambassador
Chief, USMILCOM
ADDP/Charnins
PO/Rowan
AG/Col. Studer
NAVY/Col. Anderson

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NO ACTION NECESSARY

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Rural Violence

*Barra 11/14
 J.W.
 TD 4/19*

Citizens murdered by bandits	17
Citizens wounded by bandits	6
Political assassinations	3
National Police murdered by bandits	4
National Police wounded by bandits	5
Bandits captured by National Police	3
Political assassins captured by National Police	4
Bandits captured by National Police	4
Bandits wounded by National Police	3
Bandits killed by citizens	4
National Police patrols attacked	1
Fincas attacked	11
Settlements attacked	1
Hi-Jack (highway robbery of busses, trucks, other)	3

The death of Camilo Torres occupied the spotlight in the news during the latter part of the month. It took place early on the morning of February 15 at a place called Cañon del Pilar near the municipality of San Vicente in the department of Santander. San Vicente is on the road from Socorro to Barrancabermeja and is known to be a center of considerable EEN activity and influence. According to an account received by the USAID Public Safety Rural Advisor who was in the area at the time, an army patrol of approximately 25 led by a lieutenant had been out on an early morning patrol and, having encountered nothing, was returning when it passed through a narrow draw. The "point" of the lieutenant and several soldiers was ahead of the main body when the former group was felled by a volley from the jungle growth. Those in the main body deployed and took cover, waiting. After a brief silence a group of five bandits emerged from the jungle and approached the dead and wounded where they began picking up their arms, ammunition, and other equipment. One of the bandits, apparently observing that the lieutenant was still alive, stood over him and pointed his weapon at the lieutenant's head, apparently to administer the coup d'grace. However, a soldier fired four shots, killing the bandit who was later positively identified as Camilo Torres. Other bandits were felled in the fusillade; and another group, headed by a young woman in pink denim pants, emerged to collect weapons. The woman is believed to be "Mariella", the villainess of the Simacota attack (January 6, 1965) who machine-gunned a police sergeant in cold blood in that raid. She had once been reported to have died as the result of an abortion; however, this report was later found to be false. The soldiers fired on this group, and Mariella is reported to have dropped the weapon she had picked up and ran into the woods clutching a bleeding hand. It is not known if the soldier was a poor marksman or if the pink denim distracted his aim.

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In the meantime, some campesinos living in the vicinity, upon hearing the gunfire, ran to a nearby National Police post and notified personnel there who flashed a warning over the recently installed AID-provided rural radio tactical net. Five National Police from the post tried to fight a harassing action against the bandits but became lost in the jungle. Army reinforcements arrived quickly in response to the police radio call. On the same date National Police received information of an impending attack on their post at Gámbita and radioed over the tactical net for reinforcements which were quickly supplied by the National Police and the army. The attack did not come.

Camilo Torres was defrocked in the latter part of 1965 for his political activity which was based on philosophies quite apart from those of the traditionally conservative clergy in Colombia. He had a large following among student groups of the extreme left and also had the support of some more moderate groups during the early stages of his movement. However, the latter elements gradually disidentified themselves with him, leaving him only the radical leftists. Early in January his picture appeared in the press along with two others, all being attired in guerrilla garb including beards. Victor Medina Morón, a leader in the Simacota attack by the ELN, was one of his companions in the photo. At this time Torres announced that he had "taken to the hills" and joined the ELN. There is no record of his having had any military or guerrilla training prior to his joining the ELN. It is the writer's opinion that his death may have been the direct result of his over zealotness in his desire to "prove" himself to the ELN. His body was interred in an undisclosed spot near the scene of his death.

On February 1, municipality of Santa Maria, department of Huila, a group of armed citizens defending themselves against an attack by a part of Tiro Fijo's gang killed four members of the band. Two of the citizens were killed.

On February 3, municipality of La Aguada, department of Santander, a gang of eight bandits suspected of being an element of ELN attacked a finca, sacking the house and burning it.

On February 5, municipality of San Francisco, department of Cundinamarca, a group of assassins machine-gunned to death an ANAPO (Rojista) leader. The following day National Police arrested four suspects with a submachine gun and a revolver in their possession in the nearby municipality of Facatativá.

The National Police announced that the pacification of Northern Tolima had reached the goal level with their killing of bandit leader Nacienceno Hernandez Ramirez, alias Bunto Rojo (Red Dot), and one of his

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Lieutenants, Manuel Carvajal alias "El Pollo", near the municipality of Alvarado on February 17. Punto Rojo had been a lieutenant of Desquite and later Sangre Negra, prior to their deaths at the hands of the National Police, and had subsequently activated his own gang from the remnants of gangs of the former two. He was considered a "first string" bandit leader and had more than fifty known murders to his credit. National Police had been harassing him and "whittling" at his gang for more than a year and a half. The actual events surrounding his death would make excellent material for a western movie of the 1950's. He was betrayed by a former cohort who decided to collect the 100,000 peso reward outstanding for his death or capture. The "judas" contacted the National Police and arranged to have Punto Rojo at his house on a given date on the pretext of asking the latter if he had been giving information to the authorities on the activities of the former. The informant had dug two interconnecting escape tunnels from his house, one from the kitchen and another from a clothes closet. When Punto Rojo and El Pollo arrived, the householder sent a relative through one of the tunnels to notify the police, who approached the house from the front. The quarry evidently became suspicious. The betrayer told his relative to shoot El Pollo while the former ran into one of the tunnels, and a National Police agent entered the house and shot Punto Rojo dead as he was firing into the tunnel at the "judas". It was not clear whether the latter's relative shot El Pollo as directed, but at any rate he was finished off by the National Police. The reward was paid several days later and the informer was preparing to leave Colombia.

On February 24, municipality of San Carlos, National Police captured four men in possession of a quantity of blasting caps, fuse and a large quantity of black powder and shotgun ammunition. The culprits were believed to be members of the MOBC (Students and Workers Movement in Colombia).

Urban Crime

Citizens wounded by gangsters	1
National Police murdered by gangsters	5
National Police wounded by gangsters	4
Gangsters captured by National Police	3
Gangsters killed by National Police	1
Gangsters wounded by National Police	4
Banks and financial institutions attacked	1
Hi-jack (urban)	1
Jail or prison breaks	3

On the morning of February 12 at 9:20 a.m. in Bogotá, ten gangsters armed with various weapons ranging from revolvers to submachine guns, entered a branch of the Bank of Colombia on the north edge of the central business

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district. Their first order of business was to dispose of the National Police agent on fixed post assignment there by riddling him with bullets. Several of the bandits stood shooting up the place while others seized 22,000 pesos and hit the manager over the head for good measure. The gunfire attracted other police agents in the vicinity; and two of them arrived on the scene as the bank bandits were fleeing, laying down a barrage of fire as they jumped into a waiting station wagon to make their getaway. The National Police agents, running to assist, opened fire on the fleeing vehicle, which was later located with bloodstains. Subsequently, two wounded suspects were taken into custody after they entered hospitals to seek treatment.

Civil Turbulence

Demonstrations and manifestations	7
Riots	12
Strikes	13
National Police injured in riots	5
Persons arrested in riots	106
Hecklers arrested at political rallies	24

Most of the riots reported were small and relatively insignificant, scattered in nature, and consisted of rock throwing forays by students protesting the death of Camilo Torres. Considerable property damage resulted from the total effort. A few students were arrested by National Police. However, the entire thing appeared to "fizzle out" by the end of the month in spite of announced plans to hold mock funerals and other manifestations during the month of March.

Terrorism

Arson	6
Terrorists arrested	1

The arson cases were limited to burning of dwelling houses or crops in political reprisals against individuals.

Brig. General Bernardo Camacho Leyva, Director General of the National Police, spent three weeks touring the country with chiefs of the other armed services under the Defense Ministry, inspecting, conferring with local commanders, and giving pep talks to groups of National Police personnel with respect to maintaining an impartial posture during the election and asking them to "be on their toes" with respect to maintaining order during the election period. The General acknowledged to the personnel addressed that their salaries and working conditions were not what they should be, but assured them that the command and the ministry were attempting to improve their lot

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as quickly as possible, and asked their forbearance and loyalty to duty in the meantime. It is understood that these junkets by the hierarchy are routine prior to elections.

It is the impression of the Public Safety Division that relations between the National Police and the army have improved considerably in the past ten months after having reached an all-time low during the early part of 1965. The reasons for this progress may be any of several possibilities: the ousting of Alberto RUIZ Novoa as Minister of War; the apparently forced retirement of Major General Saulo Gil Ramirez Sendoya as Director General of National Police; the fact that his successor, Brig. General Bernardo Camacho Leyva, is a cool headed individual and also has two brothers holding key positions in the army and are highly respected in all of the services; the possibility of considerable reflection on the part of the Minister of Defense on the respective roles of the National Police and the army. The U.S. Public Safety advisors sense an improved spirit of cooperation between personnel of the two services in the field where the police agents like to participate in counter-bandit operations with army elements because of the prospect of better rations, sleeping bags, raincoats, issues of ammunition and hand grenades, and transportation. It is believed that the rural tactical communications systems, such as the one recently placed in operation by USAID in Santander, will bring the services into closer collaboration, as has already been indicated by this pilot project.

Mr. Roy W. Driggers, Public Safety Training Advisor, departed February 5 for the U.S., accompanying the body of his wife who passed away February 3. After interment he spent two days in AID/W on consultation, returning to post February 20. ✓

Mr. Salvador A. Romero, Rural Public Safety Advisor, departed February 24 for Quito for the purpose of familiarizing himself with the USAID Public Safety Rural Police project there and was scheduled to return March 5.

There were no changes of high level personnel in DAS during February.

DAS accomplishments in February included the arrest of three subjects in the \$1,300,000 peso conversion of Bank of America travellers checks, capture of two subjects involved in the murder of an elderly Bogotá woman, capture by a group of Rural Security Service agents under Domingo Riaño (IPA) of a gang of counterfeiters involved in extensive operations in the Llanos Orientales, discovery of a large marihuana farm near San Juan de Arama in the Llanos and arrest of the owners.

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The increasing activity and effectiveness of the DAS counter-intelligence group in Bogotá has caused some friction with Army E-2 investigative personnel. On one occasion in February, E-2 (Military Intelligence) personnel forceably took a prisoner from DAS custody at the El Dorado International Airport. The subject was a known Venezuelan FAIN agent. Upon being informed of this incident, the Chief of DAS discussed the problem with the Minister of Defense who agreed that E-2 would not intervene in DAS investigations in the future unless their assistance is requested.

II. OPERATIONS

The three-phase riot control plan agreed upon by the USAID Public Safety Division and the National Police was being implemented successfully throughout most of the country. The first phase of the plan, the training of instructors assigned to the department commands, provided training to 120 such personnel during the month, instruction consisting of use of the baton, formations, crowd control, use of tear gas, the shield, hand-portable communications equipment, and the overall role of the National Police in riot control. The film "First Line of Defense" was shown at each training site and proved very helpful, stimulating considerable enthusiasm. The Public Safety Training and Municipal Advisors traveled with a special National Police Coordinating Officer to the cities of Cali, Medellin, Barranquilla, Bucaramanga, and Tunja in that order to give the first phase instruction. Exceptional success was enjoyed in Bogotá, Medellin, Bucaramanga, and Tunja, while there was some apathy on the part of the departmental command in Cali, compensated for by enthusiasm and cooperation on the part of the commander for the city itself. The team met with opposition in Barranquilla, where the commander and his assistant commander argued the superiority of firing over rioters' heads and stated that what they needed instead of shields and batons were shoulder weapons that would serve the above purpose. The Chief Public Safety Advisor reported the problems in these two cities to General Camacho, who appeared considerably disturbed at the attitude of the officers in Barranquilla and promised to put the matters in order immediately both in Cali and Barranquilla. The Chief Advisor also reported on the favorable receptions received in the other cities. The second phase, consisting of training of selected groups of police personnel by the instructors trained in the first phase, was completed in Bogotá during February and was well underway in Medellin, Bucaramanga, and Tunja.

The Commander of the Special District of Bogotá, who organized a special task force of 150 in response to USAID recommendations, ordered the riot control training repeated for this group to ensure that they would be a "crack" riot control unit. Similar units will be formed in most of the departments, consisting of the personnel now being trained in riot control. Training plans for these groups are:

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First Week: 8 hours training daily for 6 days, consisting of formations, use of baton, shields, gas, radios, and crowd control.

Second Week: 4 hours training daily for 6 days, consisting of practice and retraining as needed in all of the above listed subjects.

Following ~~Sixteen~~ Weeks: 2 four-hour training sessions per week. Practice and retraining as needed.

The third phase of the plan is the evaluation by the Public Safety Advisors and recommendations for improvement, with follow-up training by the National Police.

A 16 MM moving picture was taken of the training of the Bogotá group and will be developed and shown the groups in the other cities. A plan for distribution of equipment has been developed. ✓

The plan for firearms training with the Cal. .30 M1 Carbine and the .12 Ga. Shotgun has been agreed upon in general detail by the National Police and USAID. The Public Safety Training and Rural Advisors, assisted by National Police instructors, will give a two-day school in each of the following six cities beginning March 15: Santa Marta, Bucaramanga, Cali, Ibaguá, Medellín, and Bogotá, which will serve as regional training centers for the instructors from the surrounding departments. Instruction will consist of: weapon nomenclature, 8 hours; firing, 4 hours; review and instruction techniques, 4 hours.

Training will follow closely on delivery of the arms to the departments, thus calculated to achieve maximum impact. The officers trained in the centers are to return to their respective departments to train officer and non-commissioned instructors who will then go in teams to train personnel assigned to districts, stations, posts, and retens, scheduling the same course of instruction with expansion where needed. The Rural Advisor is then expected to visit the rural areas in company with an officer for the purpose of expediting and evaluating the training and arms distribution. The Training Advisor will contact the departmental training officers to follow up on training and distribution and evaluate the training programs at departmental level.

The Public Safety Training and Municipal Advisors visited the National Police School for recruit agents in Medellín on February 3. This school also serves as the police dog training center for Northern Colombia. The advisors conferred with the school director and his staff on training problems and offered suggestions for improvements and solving problems.

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The Chief Public Safety Advisor was in Bucaramanga, capital of department of Santander on February 11 to meet with the Director General of National Police, the Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief of the Navy, Chief of Air Force, Governor of the department, and the Mayor of Bucaramanga. The Director General proudly sponsored a demonstration of the new AID-provided rural tactical radio system, explained it to the group, and gave full tribute to the U.S. Government for having provided it. He also described the riot control equipment and personally demonstrated the plastic shield. The other chiefs of services congratulated Public Safety personnel on the U.S. efforts and accomplishments.

The Rural Public Safety Advisor was in the department of Santander from February 14 to 17 during which time he visited several outposts to observe the operation of the tactical radio system. He also gave on-the-spot advice with respect to security of police installations from attack, movement and procedures on rural patrol, and distribution of weapons within the patrolling groups. He reports that his advice was well received. He was also able to gather and transmit to Bogotá in detail as early as possible the news of the encounter in which Camilo Torres was killed.

The Public Safety Telecommunications Advisor and the Rural Public Safety Advisor traveled to the department of Magdalena with a crew of National Police technicians to initiate installation of the rural tactical radio system there. Nets in districts 1 and 4, the most critical, were completed, thus establishing communication with the departmental capital. A problem was encountered as the installation was about to begin because of the slowness of the departmental government in disbursing the necessary support funds. The Chief of Staff of the National Police aligned himself with the USAID Public Safety Division in implying to the governor of the department that, if the necessary financial support were not forthcoming, the project would immediately be moved to another department. The same afternoon a check for 5,000 pesos to pay the expenses of the installation team was issued, and the following day a check for 20,000 pesos was delivered for the purchase of batteries and hardware.

Installation of the system in the department of Northern Santander was initiated February 24 with no problems apparent. This will be the last of those provided for the FY-65 project.

Follow-up activities have continued on new frequency allocations for the National Police and DAS, as well as additional ones for the National Police, thus following the general frequency plan as developed by the Telecommunications Advisor.

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The National Police have provided space for a new telecommunications office, laboratory, and warehouse facility at their transmission headquarters on the southwest corner of the central business district in Bogotá. The telecommunications laboratory and offices are now located with the rest of the Public Safety Division. The National Police have agreed to remodel the quarters which will be much better suited to the operation and will relieve USAID of a burden which has been becoming an increasing problem.

It is planned to bring back the eleven National Police students taking the radio course at SENA (National Institute of Apprenticeship) in Medellin because of the deterioration of the quality of instruction there, and give them intensified training here in order to bring them up to the desired level of proficiency. In the meantime future courses in telecommunications with SENA are being planned for administration in Bogotá in order to provide for closer USAID monitoring.

Mr. Neal Jackson, communications technician in Bogotá on TDY from Monrovia, has concentrated mainly on the DAS communications program and he made notable progress during February. In the Llanos Orientales he was directly responsible for the installation of nine 20 Watt SSB stations for the Rural Security Service, including one set installed in the launch operated on the Meta River by the Rurales. He is now working on the DAS broadcast monitoring facility in Bogotá and assessing the need for maintenance facilities. Mr. Jackson's contribution to the program is highly appreciated. His presence is most helpful in remedying to some extent the lag in the DAS communications project. *Will comment upon completion of his TDY*

For information of AID/W, Major Luis Schroeder and an associate, Dr. Rafael Von Steinbeck, have been making overtures for the sale of Stoner SSB radio equipment to the Public Safety Program in Colombia on the basis that Stoner equipment is winning worldwide acceptance by USAID. They have been advised that equipment for the Public Safety Program is purchased mainly through GSA in Washington and that Stoner equipment will undoubtedly receive fair consideration. However, information is available to OPS/Bogotá indicating that Major Schroeder is also actively promoting the sale of tele-type and electronics equipment manufactured in East Germany. His involvement in maintenance and installation of Stoner equipment which might be purchased by Public Safety for Colombia is a factor that should be taken into consideration.

The counterintelligence group of DAS in Bogotá is currently engaged in a number of highly interesting operations against the ELN, the Venezuelan FALN, and against other subversive groups. In this connection the newly established interrogation room and offices of the group, as well as the technical section associated with the group, are proving their worth.

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UNCLASSIFIED
 MONTHLY TRAINING REPORT
 NATIONAL POLICE
 ANNEX I (A) FEBRUARY 1966

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Place, Type of Training, Duration	Entered Ing. This Month	Total in Training This Month	This Year to Date	Cum. Total to Date
U.S. TRAINING				
IPA/WASHINGTON 16 WKS. GENERAL COURSE		4	4	60
LOCAL TRAINING				
USE OF THE BATON				18,000
1 HR CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION COURSE				335
PATROL METHODS 1 WEEK COURSE				4,404
DRIVER TRAINING 2 WEEKS COURSE				450
REVOLVER REFRESHER TRAINING 2 HR COURSE				4,470
FBI-PPC REVOLVER TRAINING 20 HR COURSE				213
AUDIO-VISUAL 2 WKS TRAINING COURSE				24
COUNTER-BANDIT TRAINING 12 WKS DURATION		18		156
PUBLIC RELATIONS 2 WKS TRAINING COURSE				21
COUNTER-BANDIT TRAINING SPECIAL 3 WKS COURSE				450
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICIAN 9 MONTHS COURSE		12		8
COMMUNICATIONS RADIO OPERATOR 3 MONTHS COURSE				42
PUBLIC RELATIONS ENGLISH SPEAKING 3 MONTHS				37
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 3 WKS INSTRUCTOR TRAINING 8 HRS				50
RIOT CONTROL TRAINING 1 MO. POLICE MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION 220 HRS.	300	300	300	380
	25	25	25	
ABOVE TRAINING IS IN ADDITION TO TRAINING CONDUCTED BY NINE POLICE SCHOOLS IN NINE POLICE COMMANDS IN THE COUNTRY AND THE OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL "GENERAL SANTANDER"				
THIRD COUNTRY				
IAPA/PANAMA- 12 WKS GENERAL COURSE				2
IAPA/PANAMA- 1 WK. BOMB DISPOSAL COURSE				2
CRIMINALISTICS TRAINING, CARACAS				1

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MONTHLY TRAINING REPORT
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS)
ANNEX I (B) FEBRUARY 1966

Place, Type of Training, Duration	Entered Ing. This Month	Total in Training This Month	This Year to Date	Cum. Total to Date
U.S. TRAINING				
IPA, 12 WEEKS SENIOR COURSE				1
IPA/WASHINGTON				
16 WKS GENERAL COURSE	5	20		28
U.S. POST OFFICE GRAPHOLOGY, 6 MONTHS COURSE				1
TELETYPE MAINTENANCE, 5 WKS CHICAGO				1
INTERNAL SECURITY SUPERVISORY WASHINGTON - 10 WKS				1
LOCAL TRAINING				
20 HOUR REVOLVER TRAINING				
FBI-PPC COURSE (X)		53		258
SEMA, SSB RADIO COURSE, 6 MONTHS, MEDELLIN		3		3
RURAL SECURITY SCHOOL, AGUA AZUL				93
INTERNAL SECURITY COURSE, BOGOTA		11		13
DAS ACADEMY, SUBA NEW AGENTS - 3 MOS				
IN-SERVICE - 3 MOS		53		262
TECHNICAL CRIMINOLOGY 4 MONTHS		60		122
CONFERENCES IN FIELD OFFICE BY IAPA GRADUATES				630
THIRD COUNTRY				
IAPA/PANAMA - 12 WKS GENERAL COURSE				41
IAPA/PANAMA - 1 WK BOMB DISPOSAL COURSE				7
IAPA/PANAMA - 5 WKS INTERNAL SECURITY COURSE				30

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ANNEX II (A)
NATIONAL POLICE

PIO/C	P.O.	ITEMS	VALUE	CONDITION	DISPOSITION	ORGANIZATION
5-50078			14,192.00	Good	Being Distrib.	National Police
5-50168		1,2,3, 4,5a,5b,5c, 6,7,8,9,10a.	89,037.63	Good	Being Distrib.	National Police
5-50168		Sub-items: 1 to 8; 1 to 25; 1 to 31; 1 to 152; 1 to 128.	4,373.71	Good	Being Distrib.	National Police
5-50168	29		250.00	Good	Being Distrib.	National Police
5-50168	18 & 19		524.50	Good	Being Distrib.	National Police
5-50168	37		180.00	Good	Being Distrib.	National Police
0-50162	1 to 40		900.00	Good	Being Distrib.	National Police
5-50160	1 to 17 (Excl. #7)		2,669.26	Good	Being Distrib.	National Police

ANNEX II (A)

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS)

0-50105	155-66	1 to 4	275.00	Good	Being Distrib.	National Police
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ANNEX II (B)

DELINQUENT PIO/C's NATIONAL POLICE

5-50079	1,000.00	CARBINES				
0-50091		Items 3 through 14				
0-60070		Lab Equipment	2,600.00			

ANNEX II (B)

DELINQUENT PIO/C's ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS)

5-50101 MOTOR VEHICLES

ANNEX II (C)

PIO's ISSUED THIS MONTH NATIONAL POLICE (NONE)

ANNEX II (C)

PIO's ISSUED THIS MONTH ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS) (NONE)

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