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By W.W.M. NARS Date 5/16/73

Burdy

SACSM-26-62
12 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (CI)

Subject: Report of Visit to Colombia, South America, by a Team from Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina (U)

Reference: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (CI), 8 March 1962

In conformance with the instruction of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, (See paragraph 4c, above reference) forwarded herewith is a copy of a report subject as above together with the secret supplement thereto.

R. H. MOORE
Colonel, USA
Executive, SACSA

Attachment

cc: Military Rep. of the President, Chairman
The Attorney General
Dep Under Secy of State for Political Affairs
Dep Secy of Defense
Dir of Central Intelligence
Spec. Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs
Administrator, Agency for International Development

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

SWCOPT

26 February 1962

SUBJECT: Visit to Colombia, South America, by a Team from Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina (U)

TO: See Distribution

1. (C) Background: The Department of the Army directed the Special Warfare Center to send a Special Warfare Military Training Team to Colombia, and at the invitation of the Commanding General of the Colombian Army, the Commanding General, Special Warfare Center, accompanied by the Commanding Officer, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the Deputy for Operations, Plans and Training, US Army Special Warfare Center, visited Colombia and toured the areas of four of its eight brigades during the period 2 - 13 February 1962.

2. (C) Mission: The mission of the Mobile Training Team was established by the Commanding General, US Army Special Warfare Center, and was as follows:

a. After as thorough observation as time would permit to formulate recommendations to Chief, US Army Mission for the use of the Special Warfare Mobile Training Team scheduled for Colombia.

b. To evaluate the effectiveness of Colombian counter-insurgency operations with a view toward determining qualitative and quantitative requirements for additional Special Warfare Mobile Training Teams which the Special Warfare Center might be called upon to provide.

c. To recommend, if asked by the Country Team or CINCARIB, the amount and type of special warfare assistance which might be furnished to Colombia by the Special Warfare Center.

d. To evaluate the Colombian situation with a view toward integrating viable Colombian doctrine and techniques into counter-insurgency instruction presented at the US Army Special Warfare School.

e. Based on a specific request from the Colombian Minister of War and the Commanding General of the Colombian Army after arrival of the

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Special Warfare Center Team in Colombia, to develop specific recommendations for improvement of the Colombian counter-insurgency program.

3. (C) Conduct of the Survey and Narrative.

a. Itinerary followed by the Special Warfare Center Team is at Inclosure No 1.

b. A narrative report of the visit is at Inclosure No 2.

4. (C) Summary of Major Conclusions: Following are the major conclusions of the Mobile Training Team. Additional findings are at Inclosure 3.

a. Employment of a Counter-Insurgency MTT from Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, scheduled to arrive in Colombia in early March 1962.

(1) The MTT consisting of two field grade officers should be employed initially to:

(a) Initiate and advise on counter-insurgency courses at the Colombian War College and the Infantry School.

(b) Survey all courses conducted by the Brigada de Institutos Militares (BIM) to insure integration of counter-insurgency instruction pertinent to the requirements and intelligence level of the students.

(c) Assist the Country Team in developing an overall counter-insurgency plan for Colombia, and rendering detailed assistance to Colombian Army Headquarters in developing the Army's supporting counter-insurgency plan.

(d) Assist the various Brigade Headquarters in developing their counter-insurgency operations plans.

(e) Stimulate imagination and initiative of outpost commanders by on-site advice related to the accomplishment of their counter-insurgency missions.

(f) Provide Chief USARMIS a constant flow of technical observations relating to Colombian counter-insurgency plans, operations, capabilities and requirements.

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b. Special Warfare Counter-Insurgency Force-Level Requirements Estimates.

(1) It is considered that the minimum Special Warfare Units and personnel now needed to assist the Colombian Army in establishing internal security are as follows:

(a) Five detachments "A" to be used with battalions of the four brigades most heavily engaged with bandits and guerrilla elements.

(b) Control personnel for each of the above brigades, consisting of Commander, S-2, S-3, radio operator, and intelligence and operations sergeant.

(c) Control personnel for use by Chief of US Army Mission, consisting of Commander, S-2, S-4, 3 radio operators, 1 radio repairman, 1 operations sergeant, and 1 supply sergeant.

(d) A psychological operations officer and three enlisted psychological operations specialists.

c. Effectiveness of Colombian Army in Counter-Insurgency Role.

(1) Colombian counter-insurgency resources include the Army, Navy, Air Force, National Police, and DAS. Of these, the Colombian Army is the most important and plays the most active role.

(2) The effectiveness of the Army as well as the effectiveness of the entire Colombian national effort in counter insurgency is reduced significantly as a result of the absence of any central planning, coordinating and controlling agency through which all resources can be applied in concert toward solution of the insurgency and banditry problem.

(3) Whereas the many fixed outposts now occupied by the Army "show the flag" to the citizens in adjacent areas, they represent an unacceptable fragmentation of the Army's resources, and sharply reduce its capability to react quickly and in force to special situations in areas in which no outposts exist. Fixed outposts place the Army on the defensive, giving the advantage of the initiative to the dissident elements and to the bandits.

(4) Army personnel are being used in civil capacities for which they are not trained adequately and which inhibit their capability to operate against insurgents and bandits.

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- (5) The Army's most serious deficiency is its lack of essential communications needed to control maneuvering elements, to relay timely intelligence, as well as to maintain contact among fixed installations.
- (6) From the point of view of counter-insurgency, the Army's second greatest deficiency is its lack of transportation, both air and surface.
- (7) Neither national intelligence nor Army intelligence organization is adequate to collect, evaluate, collate, and disseminate information upon which to base an effective counter-insurgency campaign.
- (8) There is little evidence of counter-intelligence training, organization or skill within the Army.
- (9) The Army's relationship to the national police is not clearly defined and varies widely from one area to another. The Army is performing missions which normally should be police responsibilities.
- (10) The Army's "Civic Action" program is sporadic, not prescribed by plan, and only occasionally supported with necessary means.
- (11) There is little evidence of an Army propaganda or psychological operations program although Army units are deployed throughout areas where dissident elements are receiving significant amounts of Communist propaganda.
- (12) Deficiencies in individual equipment and rations reduce the Army's capability to undertake sustained unrelenting pursuit to ultimate capture of bandits or guerrillas once discovered.
- (13) The Army has numerous officers principally in field grade, who are highly competent and who understand the principles of counter-insurgency in all of their ramifications.
- (14) The enlisted men of the Army appear to be generally healthy, intelligent, responsive to leadership and are well disciplined.
- (15) Above and beyond organizational and training deficiencies which are within the power of the Army to correct, there are complex political, sociological and economic factors for which solutions appear remote and which will continue to provide a climate in which dissident banditry and insurgency can grow.

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5. (C) Recommendations:

a. It is recommended that the United States:

(1) Arrange with Colombia to be allowed to send police experts to make a complete study of the Colombian police structure with a view toward reorganizing, retraining, re-equipping and redeploying it to perform a complementary role to that of the Army in carrying out internal security missions.

(2) Reexamine the present MAP "six year plan" with a view toward compressing it into a two-year period, and furnishing on a selectively expedited basis those items most needed in counter-insurgency operations, i.e., transportation, carbines and automatic weapons and communications equipment. (It is noted that extraordinary effort has already been taken to speed up delivery of certain equipment, especially for the Colombian Air Force.)

(3) Urge the Colombian Air Force to acquire a higher percentage of helicopters and light aircraft, such as the helio courier in order to support Army anti-guerrilla operations.

(4) Support, in addition to appropriate maintenance units, the following type units in order of priority:

- (a) Infantry (including airborne).
- (b) Air Force helicopter and light aircraft.
- (c) Signal (when organized).
- (d) Engineer construction.
- (e) Medical.

(5) Prepare sample counter-insurgency plans for the Government, the Army and the police, and present them to appropriate authorities for their consideration.

(6) Examine USOM programs with a view toward making them supplementary or complementary, where possible, to Army-sponsored nation building or "civic action" programs.

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(7) Seek to establish a combined Colombian, US Army, USIS Council on psychological warfare and draw up a vigorous program in support of the Government's anti-guerrilla anti-bandit operations.

(8) Furnish several self-contained mobile audio visual units to the Army for use in propaganda and counter-propaganda operations.

(9) Develop several prototype anti-guerrilla organizations as a basis for programming equipment and providing further advice for Colombian counter-insurgency units.

(10) Urge the Colombian Government to accept United States Special Warfare Mobile Training Teams to support each of the four brigades most heavily engaged in counter-insurgency.

(11) At the appropriate time when political considerations will permit, urge the Colombian Government to agree to a series of joint and combined field exercises in counter-insurgency, in which US Special Forces would participate.

(12) Examine the feasibility and psychological connotations of furnishing US food surplus for use by that part of the Colombian Army engaged in active anti-guerrilla anti-bandit operations.

(13) Urge the Colombian Army to standardize and provide an adequate high calory ration for use Army-wide.

(14) Urge the Colombian Government to raise the pay of its soldiers and to improve the quality of their individual equipment.

(15) Provide instruction in fabrication and use of the AID developed "sunpower projector" for use in troop education and indoctrination, and for propaganda operations.

(16) Through the Country Team urge key officers to attend the counter-insurgency course at Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

b. The Colombian Army should:

(1) Propose a plan for gradual turnover of Army static outposts to national police, freeing Army forces to take the initiative against insurgents and bandits.

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(2) Propose a plan for phasing out military personnel now performing civil functions, turning these over, where appropriate, to police. In the meantime, insure intensive training in civil affairs for Army personnel used in a civil capacity.

(3) Propose to the National Government a concept for the role of the Army vis-a-vis that of the national police.

(4) Take the initiative in proposing a national planning, coordinating and control agency which can make most effective use of all national resources in fighting insurgency and banditry.

(5) Develop a comprehensive and feasible civic action program and give the operational elements the necessary conceptual, monetary and logistical means with which to accomplish their assigned civic action tasks.

(6) Develop an overall plan for the use of Army forces in all aspects of counter-insurgency, and require subordinate commands to prepare and carry out supporting plans.

(7) Vacate school buildings occupied by troops and assist civilian authorities to place schools back into operation.

(8) Collaborate with DAS on the development of a coordinated intelligence and counter-intelligence organizational structure for the Army and standardize reporting format and requirements for the Army's support of a national central intelligence registry.

(9) Institute immediate counter-intelligence measures throughout Army installations in order to keep appropriate Army counter-insurgency plans classified.

(10) In coordination with the National Government, develop an aggressive psychological warfare and troop indoctrination plan, train key personnel to carry out the plan and provide necessary material support.

(11) Make increased efforts to correct existing communications deficiencies, using every appropriate means to include:

(a) Pigeons.

(b) Heliograph.

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- (c) Visual semaphore.
- (d) Spots on commercial broadcasts.
- (e) Air couriers and air drop and pick-up.
- (f) Regular motor messengers.

(12) Seek to supplement gaps in military transportation by emergency civilian procurement of motor vehicles, increased use of Air Force lift and vigorous development of animal pack trains for mountain operations.

(13) Prescribe a standard Army ration and an adequate combat or emergency ration based upon calory requirements and not cost.

(14) Improve as a matter of urgency the personal equipment of the soldier to permit him to take to the field upon short notice and to engage in sustained offensive operations against dissidents or guerrillas.

(15) Present to the National Government the Army's views on a revised pay scale.

6 Incl

1. Itinerary
2. Narrative Rpt of Visit
3. Survey Team Activities
4. Observations & Suggestions
Bearing Upon Improvement of
Counter-Insurgency Capabilities
of Colombia
5. List of personnel Contacted
6. Secret Supplement (fwd under sep cover)

William P. Yarbrough
WILLIAM P. YARBROUGH
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- ~~1~~ - General Powell, CONARC
- 1 - DCSOPS
- 1 - CINCARIB
- 1 - USARCARIB
- 1 - Col Russell
- 1 - USASWS
- 1 - LtCol Little
- 1 - D/OP&T File
- 1 - CG File
- 1 - IR&A File
- 15 - Reserve IR&A

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MOBILE TRAINING TEAM

30 Jan 62

- 1540 - 1615 Travel from Fort Bragg to Grannis Field (Govt Veh)
- 1700 - 2400 Travel from Grannis Field to Panama Canal Zone (Comm Air)

31 Jan 62

- 0001 - 0435 Travel from Grannis Field to Panama Canal Zone
- 0435 - 0930 Rest
- 0930 - 1000 Briefing by 7th SF Gp Planning Element
- 1000 - 1040 Discussion with USARCARIB G-3 (Col Wilson)
- 1100 - 1200 Discussion with CINCCARIB (Gen O'Meara)
- 1400 - 1500 Discussion with USARCARIB (Gen Bogart)
- 1500 - 1600 Discussion with USARCARIB G-2 (Col Dame)

1 Feb 62

- 0800 - 0900 Travel from Fort Amador to Fort Gulick (Govt Air)
- 0900 - 1100 Briefing and discussion with Commandant, USARCARIB Schools (Col Schroeder)
- 1100 - 1215 Conference with Internal Security Dept (Col Wine)
- 1330 - 1400 Conference with Internal Security Dept (Lt Col Mas)
- 1400 - 1630 Tour of Jungle Warfare Training Center (Lt Col Goldoni)
- 1630 - 1800 Travel from Fort Gulick to Fort Amador (Govt Veh)

2 Feb 62

- 0800 - 0900 Conference with IAGS (Col Unverferth)
- 0900 - 1100 Conference with CINCCARIB POLAD (Lt Eonstra)
- 1100 - 1430 Conference with CINCCARIB Staff Members

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2 Feb 62 (continued)

- 1430 - 1500 Conference with CAS
- 1500 - 2110 Conference with 7th SF Gp Planning Element and preparation for travel to Colombia
- 2110 - 2305 Travel from Panama Canal Zone to El Dorado Airport, Bogota, Colombia (Comm Air)(1)*

3 Feb 62

- 0900 - 1200 Briefing and Conference with USARMIS, Colombia (Col Vallery and Staff)

4 Feb 62

Open Time - Sunday

5 Feb 62

- 0745 - 0815 Conference with USARMIS
- 0830 - 1030 Briefing and Conference with Colombian Army Commanding General (General Ruiz)
- 1030 - 1200 Protocol visit with Colombian Minister of War (Gen Hernandez) and Commander of Armed Forces (Gen Villamizar)
- 1300 - 1500 Luncheon with Colombian Army Commanding General
- 1530 - 1730 Protocol visit with US Embassy (Charge d'Affaire) (Mr Dearborn) and briefing by Economic (Mr Daniels) Political (Mr Bakey) and Intelligence (Mr Then) Advisors

6 Feb 62

- 0630 - 1030 Travel from Bogota to Medellin (2)*(Govt Air)
- 1030 - 1200 Briefing by IV Brigade (Col Pinzon)
- 1200 - 1300 Visit to Battalion "Girardot"
- 1400 - 1600 Travel from Medellin to Pereira (3)*(Govt Air)
- 1600 - 1700 Visit to Battalion "San Mateo".

*See Attached Map

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7 Feb 62

- 0700 - 1200 Visits to outposts La Virginia (4)*, Balboa(5)*and La Celia(6)*
- 1200 - 1330 Travel from Pereira to Armenia (7)* (Govt Air)
- 1330 - 1630 Visits to outposts Buena Vista and Kilometro 4
- 1630 - 1730 Briefing by Inf Bn "Rifles" and Engr Bn "Cisneros"

8 Feb 62

- 0700 - 0930 Travel from Armenia to Ibague (8)* (Govt Veh)
- 0930 - 1200 Briefing by VI Brigade (Col Pedrosa)
- 1300 - 1730 Visits to outposts La Palmita (9)*, Hervidero (10)*, Santiago Perez (11)*, Tuluni (12)*, and Chaparral (13)*

9 Feb 62

- 0730 - 1130 Visit to Outposts Malabar (14)*, Junin (15)*, Santa Teresa (16)*, Libano (17)*, and Amero (18)*
- 1130 - 1300 Travel from Mariquita (19)* to Melgar (20)* (Govt Air)
- 1300 - 1400 Briefing by CO Melgar Tng Center (Col Santa Cruz)
- 1400 - 1600 Observe Lancero Training

10 Feb 62

- 0730 - 1030 Visit to Lancero Outpost La Playa (21)*
- 1030 - 1330 Travel from Melgar to Villavicencio (22)* (Govt Air)
- 1330 - 1400 Briefing by VII Brigade (Col Mejia)
- 1500 - 1700 Travel from Villavicencio to Orocue (23)* (Govt Air)
- 1700 - 1800 Briefing by Oriental Navy Command (Capt Garcia)

*See Attached Map

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11 Feb 62

0700 - 1500 Rest (Sunday) Visit to local ranch (24)*
1500 - 1530 Travel from Orocué to San Jose Ocune (25)* (Govt Air)
1530 - 1630 Briefing by CO Colombia Bn (Lt Col Valencia)
1630 - 1815 Travel from San Jose Ocune to Villavicencio (26)* (Govt Air)

12 Feb 62

0700 - 0800 Travel from Villavicencio to Bogota (27)* (Govt Air)
0800 - 1400 Preparation of After Action Report
1400 - 1830 Conference with USARMLS

13 Feb 62

0800 - 1200 Preparation of After Action Report
1200 - 1230 Exit Briefing for US Ambassador (Mr Freeman)
1330 - 1600 Preparation of After Action Report
1600 Exit Briefing for Colombian Army Commanding General (Gen Ruiz)

14 Feb 62

0900 - 1150 Travel from Bogota to Panama Canal Zone (Comm Air)
1300 - 1600 Preparation of After Action Report
1600 - 1700 General Yarborough made verbal report to GENCCARIB (Gen O'Connor)

15 Feb 62

0645 - 2000 Travel from Panama Canal Zone to Fort Bragg, N.C.

*See Attached Map

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NARRATIVE REPORT

SURVEY TEAM ACTIVITIES

PANAMA

1. The team arrived Tocumen National Airport in the Panama Canal Zone, 31 January, and was met by Lt Col Reeder, Deputy G-1 USARCARIB, who was designated General Yarborough's escort officer in Panama. An itinerary had been prepared which started with a visit to USARCARIB G-3.

2. Colonel Wilson, G-3 USARCARIB, discussed the CINCARIB Special Forces planning status. In short, no firm or planned requirements have been determined for employment of Special Forces MTTs in South America. The SF planners who are in Panama are expected to assist in developing requirements for special forces detachments and augmentation detachments. Colonel Wilson had a list of MTT requirements by function which was related to counter-insurgency operations. In many respects these functions could be satisfied by a Special Forces MTT, in others augmentation detachments are required. A priority list of countries for counter-insurgency operations had been developed but it was unilaterally produced by the US Army and was not known to have State Department concurrence.

3. The team proceeded to Quarry Heights where a visit was made to General O'Meara, CINCARIB. General O'Meara emphasized that development of a special forces capability in Panama was a matter of urgency. He also stated that the presence of the force in Panama would facilitate their employment and orientation toward South America. He further stated that the presence of a Headquarters element in Panama would facilitate planning. Although recognizing the need for requirements planning, on a country basis, General O'Meara felt that movement of the Headquarters element should be as soon as practicable and that 7th Special Forces Group (Abn) should be relieved of missions in SE Asia to permit its concentration on CINCARIB areas of responsibilities. He emphasized the need for CINCARIB control of forces in his area of responsibility. General O'Meara expressed an intent to recommend reorganization of S/A MAAGs to coordinate the related military activities being conducted in South American countries and facilitate collateral activities (CI operations). CINCARIB pointed out the fallacy of pre-conceived direct comparisons between SE Asia and South America emphasizing that military action was largely influenced by the political foibles of the several South American countries, that the South American military formations were relatively well trained and competently officered and that civic action and training associated with it was probably of paramount importance. General O'Meara queried General Yarborough on missions and requirements of special forces and projected availability of special forces. General Yarborough explained the present status. Captain Newhall (USN) sat in on the conference. General O'Meara

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Instructed General Yarborough to report on his visit to Colombia on return to Panama and instructed Captain Newhall to insure that his itinerary did not require his absence on the date the Survey Team returned. The estimated date of return established was 13 February. General O'Meara was anticipating the arrival of the Secretary of Defense on 2 February and stated that counter-insurgency efforts in CARIB COMMAND would be discussed.

4. After visiting CINCARIB, the team paid a visit to CG USARCARIB. General Bogart discussed the general nature of the SA situation and collateral activities (counter-insurgency). Col Wilson, USARCARIB G-3, was present. General Yarborough again discussed the present status of the 7th Special Forces Group and pointed out the necessity for determining requirements for CI Forces (US) to permit a coordinated deployment.

5. Col Dame USARCARIB G-2 was next visited. The discussion revealed an inadequacy in US intelligence in South America and an inadequacy of intelligence in SA military forces. The advantages of SF MTT as a collection source was discussed. The teams by being in troubled areas could improve the intelligence situation immeasurably. General Yarborough emphasized that any collection performed would have to be overt and not jeopardize the teams presence in the host country.

6. The team visited Fort Gulick 2 February. The Commandant, Colonel Schroeder, gave a comprehensive briefing on the missions, organization and role of the School in CI in South America. The briefings reflected a dynamic effort to meet the requirements of the several South American countries in training. The courses at Gulick appear to be in consonance with those taught at USASWS. The school is of such high quality and offers such ready contacts with the officers and men of the SA countries that it is desirable that all MTT phased into South America attend its CI course. When SF elements are deployed to Panama it is also desirable, for the same reason, to send detachments to the school and to provide limited troop support for the school's CI course field problems. The school faculty is enthusiastic and determined in their efforts to get the maximum results in performing their mission. The Fort Gulick School plays a vital role in improving the internal security capabilities of the SA military forces. Although the present curriculum appears weak in Civil Affairs the Psychological Warfare action has been initiated to correct this deficiency. All courses conducted offer an excellent opportunity for integration of counter-insurgency and psychological operations. The subjects taught establish skills needed in indigenous forces to cope with internal security problems. There are some weak areas in the school's access to USIA and AID guidance which could be eliminated by resident liaison personnel. State Department is represented in the courses by the CINCARIB POLAD on a guest speaker basis. There is a need for closer liaison between USASWS and Fort

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Gulick which should include an instructor exchange program. There is also a need to integrate the schools effort into an overall CINCARIB plan for CI operations in SA.

7. The CINCUSARCARIB Jungle Warfare School was visited 1 February. Lt Colonel Goldoni conducted a briefing and tour of the school facilities. The curriculum and school provides an excellent training media for SF teams deployed to Panama. All teams should be phased through the course.

8. The survey party split 2 February. General Yarborough visited IAGS and was briefed by Colonel Unverferth on the missions and operations of his organization. It appears feasible to orient individuals by attaching them to IAGS teams operating in countries where US CI elements may be deployed. Colonel Russell and Lt Colonel Little visited Captain Newhall, CINCAREL J-3 Plans, and explained a theatre organization for counter insurgency operations. Recommendations were made to retain special forces under CINCARIB's operational control.

At 0900 General Yarborough visited CINCARIB POLAD and discussed the roles and missions of counter insurgency forces with Mr Boonstra. At 1430 General Yarborough visited CAS Panama and discussed the visit to Colombia and MIT relationship with CAS. Both visits were primarily aimed at orienting those individuals visited and obtaining advice on team activities in Colombia.

9. By 1500 hours the survey team activities in Panama were completed. The team departed Panama for Bogota 022110 February.

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SURVEY TEAM ACTIVITIES

COLOMBIA

1. The survey team arrived at Bogota airport, 022105 February. On arrival, General Yarborough was received by Colonel Vallery, Chief of the Army Mission. The Colombian Army Chief of Staff had the officers of the Colombian Army Headquarters assembled at the airport to be introduced to General Yarborough. This reception and movement to quarters completed the day.

2. On 3 February, Colonel Vallery assisted by his staff, briefed on the organization and plans of the Mission. The itinerary of the survey team was also discussed. Review of the Mission TD in relation to counter insurgency revealed a need for augmentation of the Mission staff. Augmentation should initially include a trained Special Warfare staff officer. The Army Mission is obviously intent on doing its job. It appears that in the absence of further guidance the Mission Chief has initiated all the action he can within fiscal and personnel limitations. A review of the FY 62 and 63 program and MIT requirements show that a sound and thorough evaluation has been made of the military situation. There is evidence that there is no real coordinated counter-insurgency plan for Colombia into which the Army Mission can integrate its efforts. The assignment of a special warfare officer will permit development of an integrated CI plan for Colombia and determination of specific requirements for CI organization, equipment and training. Linguistic qualifications should be secondary to special warfare qualifications but is also of high importance.

3. The survey team was briefed by the Colombian Army G-3, Lt Colonel Carreras. The Colonel covered the Army organization and the overall security situation. The entire public order situation is handled by decentralization to brigade with very little or other detailed guidance. Apparently, the coordination function between services receives little if any attention at Ministry level. The Army, Navy, Air Force and National Police operate largely in their separate compartments. Assumption of the coordinating role at Ministry level would improve employment of resources.

4. The team next visited General Hernandez, Minister of War for Colombia. General Yarborough took the opportunity to brief General Hernandez on the purpose of his visit and to exchange assurances of good will and helpfulness. General Hernandez requested that General Yarborough, upon completion of his visit, make specific recommendations for improvement of the Colombian counter insurgency program.

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5. The team visited the United States Embassy where General Yarborough had a brief conference with the Consul of Embassy, Mr Dearborn. This was followed by a political, intelligence and economic briefing by embassy specialists Mr Bakey, Mr Then and Mr Daniels. Mr Bakey gave a comprehensive briefing on the genesis and development of the National Front; the potential dangers of deterioration by fragmentation of the parties and some possible future developments. He pictured the structure of the liberals into the MRL and conservative factions with the Communist and extreme leftists attempting to infiltrate the MRL and seize control of liberal power. On the other hand he pictured the structure of the conservatives as two factions; a matter of rivalry between two unfriendly influential conservatives; and an extremist right element of Rojajists. Mr Then indicated some 8000 communists were in Colombia, that they were inept bumlbers and posed no real threat to the government. Mr Daniels described the economic condition of the country and current measures being undertaken by the Colombian Government to improve its fiscal situation. He clearly explained that American capital outlay was impeded by the lack of protective guarantees. He brought out the fact that past support from the World Bank was not used for the purpose originally requested. The dependence of the Colombian economy on the world market price of coffee was explained and the need for possible price pegging discussed. USIS and USOM representatives were not present at the conference but Mr Daniels discussed USOM activities in general.

6. On 6 February, the team visited the IV Brigade at Medellin. Col Pinzon, the Brigade Commander, briefed the survey team on arrival. The IV Brigade has responsibility for Antioquia, Caldas and Choco Departments. The Brigade is comprised of three Infantry, one Artillery, and one Engineer Battalion. All battalions are employed as Infantry. One Lancer Company is attached to the Engineer Battalion at Armenia. The Brigade's mission is maintenance of internal security in its area of responsibility. This mission is decentralized to battalions which are assigned zones generally coincidental with Departmental boundaries. The battalions perform their mission by assignment of company areas of responsibility. Companies maintain a total of sixty-nine outposts or patrol bases in the Brigade zone.

The Infantry battalions are located in Medellin, Manizales and Barcelona. The artillery battalion is in Pereira and the engineer battalion, less engineer equipment, is in Armenia. The Brigade has 77% of its authorized NCOs and 160% of its authorized enlisted personnel. The Brigade staff is not augmented by specialists for its "Order Publico" mission. Communication with subordinate battalions is by RCA commercial SSB radio and the public telephone system.

Colonel Pinzon passed the briefing to Colonel Lazano, his Chief of Staff, who discussed the internal security situation. In general,

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violence results from violation of the law for both political and economic reasons. Attacks are characterized by brutality, ruthlessness and mass murder to remove witnesses. In some cases, theft and land seizure for gain - outright banditry - is the motive. In other cases, removal of political opponents and revenge for like assaults is the motivation. In both cases political or criminal elements show little discrimination in selection of victims and their methods can only be classified as terrorism. He pointed out the major areas of violence. When questioned about intelligence, the Colonel described the relatively loose connection which exists between the National Police, the Brigade and the DAS. There is no joint guidance prescribing the relationships between these elements. It was found the coordination between the Army and the Police was largely dependent upon local initiative. In many cases police and Army outposts are duplicative. DAS maintains a general record of dissidents but as described it appeared to be comparatively undeveloped. Some dossiers are maintained at battalion level. The dossiers are of varying quality. Photographs are a polyglot of group pictures, mug shots and amateur photography. Finger prints are not included in the dossier and only sketchy descriptive data is entered. Formats appear standardized. Lists of wanted persons are disseminated to the battalions by the Army, the Department, DAS and the National Police. Apparently departmental lists are available only where the department has chosen to make the effort. DAS is primarily supported with criminal data and appears to provide minimal reciprocal service to the Army or National Police. There is some evidence of attempts to establish informant nets, dissemination of "wanted" posters and, through newspaper stories, publicizing the crimes and punishments of dissidents. For the most part, this is a local effort without proper guidance or trained personnel. It was noted that these facets of police techniques were desultory and inconsistent in most cases. "Wanted" poster displays were either so inconspicuous outside of outposts as to escape notice, non-existent or had been mutilated or removed by the people. Newspaper stories are not part of a planned program but the result of normal newspaper activities.

Quality of apprehended criminals is not consistent. Colonel Pinzon said that the most single factor mitigating against quelling the dissident and protective elements of the legal system properly require acceptable evidence as prerequisites to trial sentence and punishment. In many cases, the military is unable to provide conclusive proof. There are indications that some dissidents are controlled or at least supported by persons in important political positions. The investigative processes are not sophisticated enough to establish such links if they exist. The National Police are not organized into city, county and state systems. In some cases local coordination has resulted in Army assumption of police responsibilities outside the major cities. Where the Army has assumed such control, the lack of formalized training in police methods and techniques is apparent. In some cases, young officers are designated

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mayors of towns and the police function is assumed by infantry troops. This, of course, does not contribute to orderly and effective investigative efforts in crime detection and apprehension of criminals. Col Lozano pointed out that the poor communications and lack of mobility within the battalions impeded operations. In his opinion, the armament of the battalions in automatic weapons left much to be desired for combating dissidents.

7. The remainder of 6 February and 7 February were spent in visits to Battalion CPs and outposts. The Infantry Battalion at Medellin, commanded by Lt Col Vallejo; the Rifles Battalion at Barcelona, commanded by Major Acevedo and the Engineer Battalion commanded by Lt Col Salazar were visited. Generally speaking, the inadequacy of communications and mobility was apparent everywhere. The dispersion of the outposts and their patrol system seemed consistent with Brigade concepts, the troops looked well and appeared to be fairly well trained. The outpost system fragments the Army's strength into relatively ineffective platoon strength posts in isolated mountainous terrain and deprives it of the flexibility necessary for aggressive punitive action against the gangs responsible for the violence. The outpost becomes the hub for short range patrols which can be easily observed by unfriendly persons. This results in violence being committed in unpatrolled areas with the assurance that patrols will not intervene. Eventually all fixed posts should be a National Police responsibility. Until the Police are better trained and have gained the confidence of the people, the Army will have this unproductive mission. The psychological operations, civic action, and intelligence requirements of internal security were not well developed anywhere in this area. The inherent potentials for this work cannot be exploited until outpost commanders are assigned objectives in this phase of internal security operations and receive the training and guidance to make information activities effective. Brigades need operations directives which prescribe methodical phasing of activities to eventual conclusion of a successful campaign for their areas of responsibility.

8. The team arrived at VI Brigade Headquarters in Ibague 00950 February. Colonel P. and his staff presented a comprehensive and well organized briefing. The VI Brigade has responsibility for Tolima and Huila Departments and Cauqueta territory. The Brigade is comprised of four infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, one Iscero company, a truck company and a medical section. The Brigade's mission is the same as that of the IV Brigade. The VI Brigade has a counter-insurgency plan and the commander has taken a positive approach to the problems in his area. He has promulgated a program in his brigade area which he calls "Plan B" which includes protection of the populace, check point operations, search and surveillance patrols, guard posts,

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civic action and cooperation with the civilian government, particularly the justice department. Within its assigned area the VI Brigade maintains 104 outposts from which patrol and police activities are conducted. Battalions are assigned zones of responsibility. Neither the Brigade nor battalion staffs are augmented for the Order Public mission.

Communications with battalions are maintained in the same manner as the IV Brigade. The causes of violence are much the same in the VI and IV Brigades. The VI Brigade has coordination meetings with the police, DAS and civil leaders on a daily basis at which information is shared and projects determined. The commander has an intelligence program in the brigade in which files and dissemination appear to play a good part. The brigade commander understands the theory and practice of counter-insurgency. He needs assistance in Psychological Operations, CIB and CIB skills, transportation and communications to reach maximum effectiveness in following the plans. It appears the outpost system must be supplemented by a truly mobile force in the Brigade area of responsibility. The outpost system should continue its local patrols and the mobile force should range beyond the areas of the outposts. Following the briefing in Kobago, the team visited 12 outposts. They were neat, well situated from a security viewpoint, the soldiers were clean and alert and patrol plans were prepared. Each outpost had one to three helicopter pads. There is obvious use for helicopters throughout the Brigade area for logistical support as well as reconnaissance, civic action and information services for the people. The existing outposts are not being fully utilized as media for informing the people. USIS and Colombian films could be disseminated to those outposts near villages, patrols could distribute pamphlets and booklets. In many cases, the military are the sole governmental representative in their assigned sectors. Governmental medical, agricultural and educational assistance can be administered through them. Before any of this can happen, the outpost commanders must be provided the support to make these actions possible and be made to understand by instruction and guidance how to proceed in these matters. He must have qualified technical assistance for medical aid programs, he must have pack animals for movement of material over undeveloped trails and his troops must be properly educated and motivated to enthusiastically perform these "non-military" tasks. He needs simple visual instructional aids such as the sunpowered aid the support of a coordinated planning and Colombian effort. Directional aid is much needed for improvement in this effort in civil projects are exemplary. The Brigade Commander is full of ideas and enthusiasm and with help his plans should work. Despite this judgement, the VI Brigade is also fragmented by the fixed outpost system. Outposts observed were defensive installations with perimeter trenches, alert plans and practices. None of these things is intrinsically bad, but it appears they have become

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routine and time consuming to the collection of other more important matters. In one case a machine gun mounted in a public room had no field of fire, a mortar (60 mm) had no planned concentrations and was not kept in position. Questioning brought out the fact that the dissidents and bandits avoided direct clashes with the military elements and outposts had not been attacked, molested or harassed. Some of the outposts have been maintained since the political violence in 1948.

9. The team then proceeded to Melgar Training Center and was met by Colonel Santa Cruz, the Center commander. The Melgar Post is subordinate to the School Brigade headquartered at Bogota. It is the home station of the "Colombia" Infantry Battalion, Logistics Headquarters, the Lancero School and the "Caldas" Combat Engineer Battalion.

The Colombia Battalion is on detached duty in the Llanos with one recruit left at Melgar; the Lancero Company is headquartered at Cabrero and "Caldas" mission. The "Caldas" Infantry Battalion has three main missions: a training mission - Lancero course - ten weeks; a repair course - five weeks; a repair course - twenty weeks. The remainder of the afternoon was spent observing demonstration training.

During the morning of 10 February, the team visited the Lancero outpost at La Playa. The outpost was much the same as others observed. Defensive fences and ditches had been prepared. The platoon had mules and horses for patrols and logistical support. No more than one hundred yards from the outpost, an abandoned school without one teaching aid was observed. There is a serious shortage of schools in rural areas and this could most certainly be used. The outpost personnel, properly supported, could operate it.

10. The team next visited the VII Brigade at Villavicencio. The Brigade is responsible for Vichada, Arauca, and Vaupar territories, the Department of Meta and a proportion of Boyaca. Two infantry battalions, the "Vargas" and "Colombia" battalions; and one cavalry group comprise the Brigade Forces. The Eastern Naval Forces with one marine company are under the Brigade Commander's operational control. The Brigade maintains twenty-two outposts in the area and the police approximately fifty-five. The brigade zone was quiet at the time of visit. Most of the outposts are in the western portion of the Brigade zone, specifically Meta Department where dissidents are cut across the School Brigade and VI Brigade Zones. Although the Brigade commander did not mention it in his briefing, a 120 man force called Rurales is maintained by the Colombian government and operates under the direction of DAS. The Rurales are horsemounted, not uniformed, government paid police, who can be compared with the Texas

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Ranger functionally and are alleged to have had some success in maintaining law and order. Not much detailed information was available concerning the Rurales.

11. The next installation visited by the team was the Naval Station at Orocué. The Commander gave a very brief orientation. His mission is maintenance of order in his assigned area, assisting commerce and improving health and welfare of inhabitants in his area. His greatest problem appeared to be coordination with the VII Brigade. Specific comments were made on the utilization of different types of various elements of the Brigade, a propensity for the Brigade to employ troops in his area without previous coordination and the danger of clashes of Army or Marine troops with Rurales because of identification difficulties. This commander stated he has no capability beyond defense of Orocué.

12. After departing the Naval Post at Orocué, the team proceeded to the Colombian Battalion near San José Ocué. The area was run by Lt Col Valencia, the Battalion Commander, who stated that in recent time problem had been reduced. Bandits were still operating but the Battalion Commander indicated that although this should be police work, the battalion was continuing efforts to apprehend them. The Battalion Commander has made a successful attempt to win the confidence of the Indians in his area of responsibility. His patrols visit their villages and assist them in their problems within his capability. He has established an Army-sponsored store to put basic needs within the Indians' reach and as a consequence the Indians have assisted Lt Col Valencia in his internal security mission.

A tour of his company outpost revealed that ingenuity had created a liveable, clean field camp, using local resources. Vehicles observed were clean; uniforms were worn but clean; individual equipment, belts, pouches, canteen covers, needed replacement.

The battalion zone is an enormous area divided into company zones. Three companies are under the Battalion Commander's operational control and one company at Puerto Lopez is under the VII Brigade's operational control.

Communications within the battalion are by AMERG-9; with Brigade SSE. There is apparently much difficulty with the SSE through faulty frequency assignments.

The battalion commander's supervision of his companies is difficult because of the distances which he must cover. He more than anyone visited needs light aircraft support to properly command and coordinate his companies.

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13. The team departed San Jose on 13 February and stayed at Villavicencio and returned at Bogota the following morning. At 1245 General Yarborough presented the major conclusions and recommendations to the US Ambassador, Mr Freeman, who had no objection to what is shown in this report. At 1300 hours, General Yarborough presented to General Ruiz those parts of the report relating to things the Colombian Army should do and the list of ideas for improving the internal security situation. General Ruiz was very receptive to everything except acceptance of the Special Forces A detachments.

14. The team departed Colombia at 1300 hours 14 February, arriving in Panama prior to noon. General O'Meara, C/O SINGAPORE, was in Panama and not expected to return until sometime 15 February. The team spent the afternoon and evening of 14 February completing a second draft of an after-action report. General Yarborough presented a verbal summary of the report to General O'Connor, C/O SINGAPORE, during the afternoon of 14 February and requested permission to depart for COMUS early 15 February in view of pending business at Fort Bragg. Permission was granted. A copy of the draft after-action report was left for General O'Meara's information. The team departed Panama early 15 February and arrived Fort Bragg at 1910 hours, 15 February 1952.

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OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
IMPROVEMENT OF CURRENT TROOP AND GARRISON

1. Personnel

- a. The pay of the conscript soldier is only about \$2.00 per month. This low pay linked with a generally inadequate ration makes most troops on operational missions will occasionally steal food and thus turn civilians against them.
- b. Troops are alert, appear responsive to leadership, and to discipline.
- c. Officer corps exerts personal leadership at the junior officer level but seems lacking generally in imagination and initiative and experience.
- d. There is little evidence of attention to soldiers' life or recreational needs. Bulletin boards exist but nothing of value is posted. Generally no library material is on hand for studying garrison life.
- e. No pictures of President Diem or Army high command are posted in garrisons.
- f. No Government propaganda seen in hands of troops.
- g. There is a distinct need for a self contained mobile medical unit to visit troop outposts as well as adjacent civilian villages. This could be jeep borne or deliverable in the "KUH" helicopter.
- h. Few of the isolated posts have radio receivers to get news and music. There should be regular army broadcast programs from commercial nets. These should contain certain police reports.
- i. Officer and NCO shortages are widespread and are affecting Army operations.

2. Intelligence

- a. Information in hands of troops is limited. Daily intelligence information on the current situation should be provided to all outposts daily.
- b. Map corrections and improvements should be made by battalions using a constant flow of reports from garrisons.

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c. Patrols should be equipped with cameras.

--. Film strip projectors or slide projectors should be used to brief troops on bandit personalities and M.O. (modus operandi).

e. A national central registry should be established at once based on an appropriate CIM system. All community data, organizational data on bandit bands, etc. should go to the central registry. Their commands should be furnished weekly, monthly, and upon the files of appropriate intelligence information. Every village or street should have a name should be furnished a simple transmitter which should be required to report in at regular intervals with positive or negative results. Failure to report in without proper excuse should be of concern.

f. Every village should be required to post a list of names of bandit leaders and it should be an offense to tamper with them. Patrol officers should check posters at unannounced intervals.

g. All military and police personnel must have some means of communication with their next higher headquarters. This communication should be by radio but pending receipt of radios, though, should be given to:

- (1) Heliograph
- (2) Semaphore flags
- (3) Blinker
- (4) Pigeons
- (5) Smoke signals
- (6) Flare codes
- (7) Spots on commercial broadcasts
- (8) Motor and Air couriers.

h. A combined counter-intelligence plan for penetrating guerrilla bands should be worked out by the Army and DAS. This should involve creation of "personnel" and a credible story to induce personalities to join a bandit gang.

--. Polygraph operators should be trained by the Army and DAS and should habitually interrogate villagers who are believed to be knowledgeable of guerrilla activities.

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j. The Army and the Government should collaborate on an anti-guerrilla anti-bandit museum where all known methods together with artifacts used by bandits can be studied by anti-guerrilla personnel.

k. Carefully collected and prepared statistics covering every aspect of the guerrilla-bandit problem should be published to the anti-guerrilla forces.

l. Exhaustive interrogation of bandits, to include sodium pentathol and polygraph, should be used to elicit every shred of information. Both the Army and the Police need trained interrogators.

m. An intensive civilian registration program should be undertaken in order that every resident of Colombia be eventually registered in government files together with fingerprints and photographs. Government registration personnel with cameras and fingerprint apparatus must accompany military patrols.

n. The IAGS mappers should give priority to mapping of affected areas. Army operational maps should be re-examined.

o. Army CID and DAS technicians should maintain a registry exhaustively for Modus Operandi which should enter the central registry and also be sent to Police Posts and Army outposts. This list should be related to specific bandit personalities when possible.

p. Specific officers in both the police and Army should be assigned study missions against specific bandit personalities in the way counter-intelligence agents would operate. They should keep data on all aspects of the bandits appearance, family history, background, habits, idiosyncracies, education, etc. They should keep charts of the movements of their target personalities.

3. Propaganda

a. There is little evidence of a well organized Government sponsored or an Army sponsored propaganda program, but there is evidence of an active communist sponsored program.

b. Every military and police outpost should have a government propaganda distribution station for:

(1) Printed materials

(2) Pictures

(3) Displays

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- (4) Posters
- (5) Discussion leaders to talk to villagers
- (6) Radio receivers tuned to government radio, set up in public square

c. Propaganda should hammer on themes:

- (1) Banditry is not glamorous but shameful. Bandits should be re-named by government propagandists, using ludicrous and insulting names based upon personal or family characteristics.
- (2) Bandits should be depicted as murdering Filipina like snakes eating young chickens and game.
- (3) People who support and protect bandits should be shown as cowardly half animals pointing out their sleeping young to the snakes.
- (4) The government is working to make the people's lot better while the bandits are doing everything to make it worse.
- (5) All bandits everywhere eventually meet the same violent end as may people who protect them.
- (6) The Army will shoot bandits on sight, and is using all modern means to track them down.
- (7) Bandit bands should be played against each other. Government propaganda should allege certain gangs gave evidence against others, and should fabricate evidence to include picture of gang member receiving government award.
- (8) Villages and areas known to harbor bandits should be alleged by the government to be feeding information to the government. Polygraph teams, should elicit such information as is needed for this operation.
- (9) Government successes against bandits should be blown up to great proportions. Bandit attacks should be universally described as amateurish, stupid, unsuccessful due to caliber of bandit leadership.

4. Operations

- a. Relationship between the Army and the Police should be clarified from the national level.

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- b. In addition to the Army there are needed:
 - (1) Provincial (state police)
 - (2) City Police
 - (3) Village constables
- c. In general, fixed posts now occupied by Army forces in affected areas should be garrisoned by state police.
- d. City police should confine their attention to city areas only, and should have traffic, statistical, and criminal elements.
- e. Village constables should have intelligence, propaganda, and statistical capabilities and missions.
- f. All police installations should be tied together with teletype, radio, and telephone.
- g. Each police installation should have a formalized and understood link both with DAS and with Army intelligence.
- h. All internal security elements of the armed forces and DAS should use the same central registry and should provide a flow of information to it.
- i. Army units should have no fixed posts designed primarily for anti-bandit or anti-guerrilla work. Anti-bandit army forces should be constantly on the move by helicopter by vehicle and on foot. Their itineraries and length of stay in any area should be kept secret, but police posts in the vicinity should be kept informed.
- j. All maneuvering Army units must be tied in to their next higher headquarters by radio, pigeon, air courier or other means.
- k. Army forces assigned to counter-guerrilla operations must be capable of breaking camp and moving out with complete gear within one hour after an alert is given.
 1. Individual packs and equipment must be constantly ready.
- m. All mountain operations should be envisaged as requiring use of mules or burros, and these should be held in readiness at all anti-bandit Army installations or camps.

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- n. Bandit hunting Army units should seldom exceed 30 men and should carry necessary supplies to subsist for at least one week in the field without resupply.
- o. Helicopter resupply and evacuation for maneuvering troops should be normal and practiced frequently.
- p. Individual arms should be light automatic or semi automatic, should include some rifle grenades, and two 60 mm or 2" mortars per force of 30 men.
- q. Brigade boundaries should be disregarded when anti-bandit operations so dictate. Since the bandit observes no boundaries, neither should his pursuer.
- r. Headquarters Colombian Armed Forces together with DAS and police command, should
- (1) Determine order of priorities of areas for intensive anti-bandit operations.
 - (2) Develop a joint patrol plan designed to cover every square kilometer of the affected area.
- s. Intensive anti-bandit drives should be undertaken in the same manner as military operations. These should comprise both "campaigns" and "battles" and should be aimed at specific, immediate and overall objectives.
- t. There should be an overall support commander for each anti-bandit campaign.
- u. Campaign plans for anti-bandit operations should contain all pertinent elements that normally apply to military campaigns.
- v. Once pursuit of a bandit gang begins it should not terminate until the bandit is captured or killed.

5. Logistics

- a. Soldiers need better, more rugged footgear. Each platoon sized unit which may operate alone should have one man trained in shoe repair and equipped with simple tools for so doing.

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b. Soldiers operating in mountains should wear ruanos of military color and design. These should be reversible with a white underside for night operations.

c. There should be a standard type of mountain rucksack for each anti-bandit soldier, kept packed and ready. This should contain a cooking utensil, knife, fork and spoon, a pencil and notebook, 2 pairs of heavy socks, a length of rope, toilet articles, an emergency ration, a sewing kit, as a minimum.

d. Each soldier should habitually take to the field with a full canteen.

e. All officers should carry binoculars and a map case in addition to equipment prescribed for each soldier.

f. Mules should carry:

- (1) Radios and batteries.
- (2) Water cans and Lyster bag.
- (3) Mule rations, grooming gear, picket lines, harness repair kit.
- (4) Medical pack and litters.
- (5) Tentage as required for protection during seasons.
- (6) Auto weapons as needed.
- (7) Mortars.
- (8) Mortar ammunition.
- (9) Rations.

g. The Colombian Army field ration is inadequate in calory content and packaging.

h. Army pack saddles should be improved to include quick release fittings to take the place of time consuming lashing.

6. General

a. The drivers of public busses which traverse affected areas should be given gas projectors or scatter guns. Gas should be incapacitating or at least tear gas.

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b. Busses should be fitted with automatic alarm systems which once turned on cannot be turned off until they run down.

c. The Army and police should covertly introduce armed armored busses into the transportation system, filled with soldiers or police in civilian clothing.

d. Bandits pictures should appear on TV regularly together with data on their crimes.

e. Army, Air Force and police should develop a cordon system to isolate every area in which bandits are known to be or believed to be operating. The area should not be released until every man, woman and child 12 years or older has been questioned. Curfews should be announced by helicopters, home loudspeaker and leaflet until the search is finished. Inhabitants should be treated with respect and consideration until found to be affiliated with the bandits.

f. The Army should start procurement and training of tracking dogs without delay. Each outpost should have at least two.

g. There should be a joint operations center in Bogota and at each brigade and battalion headquarters where daily bandit movements are evaluated and from which all anti-bandit operations are planned, coordinated and controlled. Members should be Army, Air Force, Police, and DAS.

h. A village which turns against bandits should be given immediate government aid of some sort, including a police presence moved in by the quickest means.

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COLOMBIAN PERSONNEL CONTACTED

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
Maj General	HERNANDEZ	Minister of War
Maj General	VILLAMAZAR	CG, Armed Forces
Maj General	NUOVA, RUIZ	CG, Colombian Army
Maj General	PIZARRO	Commander BIM
Maj General	POWELS	CG, Air Force
Admiral	MUNOZ	Chief, Military Factory
Admiral	PORTO	Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral	VERON	Chief of Staff, Navy
Brig General	AYERBE	CG, Colombian Army
Brig General	CARERRA	CG, Colombian Army
Colonel	PINZON	IV Brigade
Colonel	PEDROZO	VI Brigade
Colonel	MEJIA	VII Brigade
Colonel	LAZANO	IV Brigade
Colonel	SANTA CRUZ	Melgar Post
Colonel	MUNOZ	VII Brigade
Commander	GARCIA	CG Base
Lt Colonel	MUNOZ	CG, IV Brigade
Lt Colonel	BANILLO	CG, 18th Inf Bn
Lt Colonel	SALAZAR	CG, 17th Inf Bn
Lt Colonel	VALENCIA	CG, Colombian Bn
Lt Colonel	CARAVAJAH	G-2 Army

Incl #5

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By _____ Name Date _____

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)

By _____, N/A/S Date _____

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
Lt Colonel	FERRO	G-4 Army
Lt Colonel	VARGAS	G-1 Army
Lt Colonel	PORRAS	G-3 Army
Lt Colonel	SANCHEZ	CO, 1st Cavalry Group
Lt Colonel	VALASQUEZ	Commandant, Artillery School
Lt Colonel	PEREA	Commandant, Cavalry School
Lt Colonel	SANCHEZ	CO, MP Bn
Lt Colonel	MATTALENA	Commandant, Infantry School
Lt Colonel	LOPEZ	Commandant, Engineer School
Lt Colonel	GUTIERREZ	Commandant, Medical School
Lt Colonel	SUAREZ	Commandant, Signal School
Lt Colonel	VALLEJO	CO, Battalion Rifles
Lt Colonel	MENDEZ	B-3, VI Brigade
Lt Colonel	GOMEZ	B-4, VI Brigade
Lt Colonel	BELLINA	CO, 15th Battalion
Major	PINZON	Commandant, Lancero School
Major	ASAUADO	CO, 1st Battalion
Captain	CASTANO	B-1, VI Brigade
Captain	CASCANTE	B-2, VI Brigade
Captain	CHARRE	B-3, 4th Battalion

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SECRET

43-17514-7
12-15-77

By _____ NARS Date _____

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SECRET SUPPLEMENT
COLOMBIAN SURVEY REPORT

1. (S) Even complete implementation of the recommendations made in the basic report will not bring decisive or lasting results unless there is an appreciative amelioration of the political climate and the economic situation in Colombia. In view of the propensity of most of the leaders in both political and economic fields to ignore their national responsibilities and to seek personal aggrandizement instead, it is considered that positive measures should be taken to influence the situation if a debacle occurs in Colombia.

2. (S) It is the considered opinion of the survey team that a concerted country team effort should be made now to select civilian and military personnel for clandestine training in resistance operations in case they are needed later. This should be done with a view toward development of a civil and military structure for exploitation in the event the Colombian internal security system deteriorates further. This structure should be used to pressure toward reforms known to be needed, perform counter-agent and counter-propaganda functions and as necessary execute paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents. It should be backed by the United States.

3. (S) If we have such an apparatus in Colombia it should be employed now before communist proponents become too strong to combat. The team has reason to suspect that the Rurales operating in the Llanos are CAS directed through DAS in Colombia. If this suspicion is true, it is a step in the right direction, provided CAS has positive leadership influence over it.

4. (S) The apparatus should be charged with clandestine execution of plans developed by the United States Government toward stated objectives in the political, economic and military fields. This would permit passing to the offensive in all fields of endeavor rather than depending on the Colombians to find their own solution. Although the latter would be preferable, there is no assurance that time exists to await developments.

Incl #6

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